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The Future of Fishery Management and
Its Impact on the Seafood Industry: A
Comparison of United States and

Canadian Fishery Management
Policies After UNCLOS III
Ferdinand J. Gallo III

ABSTRACT

The United States and Canadian fishery management regimes each
professes to fulfill the goals of conservation enumerated under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS III).
These goals include conservation of scarce fish stocks and "optimum utilization" of those limited resources. The Canadian regime of centralized
authority, informality and flexibility, however, actually comes closest to
fulfilling these goals. While the United States may adopt some of the key
elements of the Canadian regime, several barriers exist to such reforms.
Another method for reconciling the differences between U.S. and Canadian policies would include the implementation of an international treaty
to jointly manage the fishery region. Such a treaty remains a viable alternative to the current international regime of sovereign states' rights and
strict notions of territorialism.
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INTRODUCTION

Approximately ninety percent of the world's fishing takes place
within 200 nautical miles of the coast of some sovereign nation.1 UNCLOS III introduced three new elements to the regime for fishery management: "the management of migrating fish stocks; conservation
measures for such living resources; and the 'optimum utilization' of fish
stocks." 2 Within the last fifteen years, Canada3 and the United States4
have expanded jurisdiction over their fisheries to 200 nautical miles. For
most Coastal States, the immediate and substantial gain to be won at
UNCLOS III was increased ocean space and resources which could be
brought under their respective jurisdictions and control. Prior to UNCLOS III, the concept of the "continental shelf" had been the accepted
ground for a new regime of exclusive Coastal State control over marine
resources under customary international law.6 The bounds of this preUNCLOS III legal definition of the outer limits of this regime, however,
remained elastic, and it lay in the interest of "broad margin states" such
as Canada and the United States, "to prevent a redefinition that would
force them to roll back their claims to 'sovereign rights' over the nonliving resources in their adjacent offshore waters." 7

In this context, the

facts of geography and geology prevailed over any other consideration.
This process had been, and continues to be under UNCLOS III, complicated by increasing political, economic and social pressures, and advanced scientific discoveries.
During this fifteen year period, two radically different approaches to
fishery management emerged. The U.S. regime emphasizes formalized
procedures and a high degree of public accountability. The Canadian
regime, in contrast, emphasizes informal procedures, flexibility and the
centralization of authority.'
As the world's population continues to rise, greater pressure is
1 BERNARD H. OXMAN ET AL, THE LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA 137 (1983).

See also MARTIN I. GLASSNER, NEPTUNE'S DOMAIN 73 (1990).
2 Id. at 137-38.
3 Fishery Zones of Canada (Zones 4 & 5) Order, R.S.C. ch. 1548 (1978).
4 Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882
(1976)[hereinafter MFCMA].
5 See infra note 11.
6 DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, CANADA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 4

(1985).
7 Id.

8 See, e.g., Rodney A. Snow, Extended FisheryJurisdiction in Canadaand the United States, 5
OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 291 (1978); DAVID L. VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD (1983); David L.
VanderZwaag, Canadian Fisheries Management: A Legal and Administrative Overview, 13 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 171 (1983).
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placed upon the ocean's limited resources. Food products harvested
from the seas may provide a valuable source of nutrition for feeding this
rising population. The demands of population expansion consequently
necessitate an investigation of the two marine fishery management regimes in Canada and the United States. These regimes must be compared to determine which format-the formal approach favored by the
United States, or the functionalist, informal approach of Canada-most
efficiently and effectively meets the conservation recommendations prescribed by UNCLOS III. This Article focuses upon the impact the two
regimes have on the conservation and "optimum utilization" requirements of UNCLOS III, and provides suggested reforms to more readily
fulfill these requirements.

II.

BACKGROUND

In 1973, the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
was charged with preparing a uniform law of the sea by universal agreement. 9 In 1975, the officers of the Conference accumulated information
from prior informal negotiations and submitted it as an informal text at
the conclusion of that session.10 After eight subsequent sessions, a final
draft emerged. 1 Following the United States' call for a record vote on
April 30, 1982, the Conference adopted the draft text by a vote of 130
delegates in favor and four against. 2 The United States refused to ratify
the text of this document for national security reasons relating to off13
shore mining rights, not for the draft's conservation measures.
The Preamble of the 1982 Conference refers to the need to "promote
the equitable and efficient utilization of resources" while "taking due regard for the sovereignty of all states ...."14 In addition, the Preamble
notes that the achievement of such conservation goals "would contribute
to the realization of a just and equitable international order which takes
9 For the historical development of UNCLOS III, see generally DAVID J.ATTARD, THE ExCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-31 (1987); GLASSNER, supra note 1, at 8-17.

10 4 Official Records (1974) at 137ff (1975); A/CONF.62/WP 10; A/CONF.62/114.
I1 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Doe. A/CONF.62/122, 7 Oct. 1982,
opened for signature 10 Dec. 1982 [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
12 21 I.L.M. 1245ff, 1477ff (1982).
13 George D. Haimbaugh, Impact of the Reagan Administration on the Law of the Sea, 46 WASH.
& LEE L.REv. 151 (1989) ("President Reagan added that ...the United States would seek changes
necessary to correct unacceptable elements of the draft treaty and to achieve a treaty that would not
deter development of any deep seabed mineral resources to meet national and world demand...
[that] will ensure a national access to these resources by current and future qualified entities to
enhance U.S. security of supply...)
14 ATTARD, supra note 9, at 157; see also UNCLOS III, supra note 11.
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into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole ... "15
Thus, the Preamble indicates the desire of the signatories to create a new
international order; one in which cooperation between sovereign states
would enhance existing fish stocks. Such enhancement would lead not
only to benefits for specific nations but for the world as a whole. Such
goals are further emphasized in the articles of UNCLOS III.
According to Article 56 of UNCLOS III, "the Coastal State's sovereign property rights in the exclusive economic zone include exploring
and exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters adjacent to the sea bed." 16 The essence of
the proposals in the draft convention are summarized in three general
principles:
(1) the Coastal State determines the allowable harvest of living resources
within its exclusive economic zone, assuring that these resources will be
protected from over-exploitation; (2) the Coastal State determines its own
capacity to exploit those resources; and (3) the Coastal State shall give
other States access to the surplus 17
of the allowable catch, with the general
objective of 'optimum utilization'.
In determining the total allowable catch in accordance with Article 61,
the Coastal State attempts to ensure preservation of living resources
through a regime of conservation and management-a significant departure in international law dealing with the orderly utilization of natural
resources. 18
Article 56(l)(a) of the Convention recognizes each Coastal State's
sovereign rights for "exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing
living resources within the exclusive economic zone."19 Most States
adopted this provision verbatim.2" The United States Exclusive Economic Zone Proclamation, for example, affirms "sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources, both living and non-living." 21
Article 61 of the Convention contains the key provisions pertaining
to the conservation of living resources in the exclusive economic zone.
Under Article 61, Coastal States are obligated to ensure that the region's
living resources are not depleted through over-exploitation and to deter15 Id.
16 Id. at 150.
17 Lawrence Juda, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Ocean Management, 18 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 305-31 (1987); see also ORREGO VICUNA, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: REGIME AND
LEGAL NATURE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 50-53 (1989).
18 ATTARD, supra note 9, at 149-56.
19 Id. at 151.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 150 n.36.
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mine the most efficient allowable harvest.2 2 This allowable harvest is the
catch which, if taken in any given year, will best fulfill the objectives of
the "optimum" long-term yield. In order to achieve this goal, the
Coastal State "shall ensure that proper conservation measures shall be
taken. ' '2 3 These conservation measures are to be prescribed "taking into
consideration the best scientific evidence available to the Coastal
State." 2 Conservation and management procedures are to be designed
and implemented "to maintain or restore populations of fish at levels
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield"-the yield that can
be taken year after year without depleting the stock.2 ' By subjecting the
maximum sustainable yield to "relevant environmental and economic
factors, including the economic needs of the Coastal State and the special
requirements of developing States," 26 the Convention tempers the scientific character of the determination of the maximum sustainable yield
with subjective judgments of verifiable economic and ecological factors.
The Convention further states that conservation and management
regimes shall take into consideration "the effects on species associated
with, or dependent upon harvested species, with a view to maintaining or
restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above
27
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened.
Thus, UNCLOS III emphasizes not only preservation of current fish
stocks harvested by regional fishermen, but also dependent stocks. Such
stocks, while not in immediate danger of depletion through over-exploitation, might be threatened through depletion of other existing
stocks. UNCLOS III takes a more long-term view to protecting and enhancing the marine fishery stocks of coastal states, than any prior international agreement.2 8
Therefore, the primary conservation goals of the 1982 Convention
are to ensure:
(1) the determination of the total allowable catch; (2) that the living resources in the exclusive economic zone are not endangered by over-exploitation; (3) that the populations of such species are maintained or
restored at levels that allow the maximum sustainable yield; and (4) that
associated or dependent species are maintained above levels at which their
22
23
24
25
26
27

Id. at 152; see also UNCLOS III, supra note 11, at art. 61(2).
FAO Document submitted to UNCLOS III, Doe. GE 75-64093.
UNCLOS III, supra note 11, at art. 61(2).
Id. at art. 61(3).

Id.
Id. at art. 61(4).

28 See, eg., GLASSNER, supra note 1, at 16-17.
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reproduction may be seriously threatened. 29
With this brief overview of the major provisions of UNCLOS III, this
Article focuses its attention on the existing fishery management regimes
in the United States and Canada. The following sections discuss the major characteristics of each regime, and analyze these regimes in light of
the provisions of UNCLOS III.
III.

FISHERY MANAGEMENT REGIMES

Within the last fifteen years, both the United States and Canada
have adopted exclusive economic zones.3 0 Further, Canada ratified the
provisions of UNCLOS III in 1982, while the United States did not.31
However, in establishing an exclusive economic zone with regard to fishery management, the United States incorporated much of the language
of the Convention. 2 While both nations have adopted the conservation
goals of UNCLOS III, 3 each nation has implemented very different
management regimes. The Canadian regime emphasizes centralized authority and flexibility, while the U.S. regime is characterized by a high
degree of formalized procedures and separation of authority in planning
and implementation. The following sections of this Article compare the
regimes as they relate to the conservation directives of UNCLOS III.
This article finds that the Canadian regime is better suited to foster international cooperation.
A.

The Canadian Regime

Textually, the Canadian Constitution grants the federal government
exclusive control over domestic fisheries. Section 91(12) of the Constitution Act of 1867 affords the federal Parliament "exclusive legislative authority over the sea and inland fisheries.",3 4 Two statutes expressly
address the management of Canadian fisheries: the Fisheries Act 35 and
the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act.36 These two statutes authorize the
Canadian Cabinet and the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to manage
29 Shigeru Oda, Fisheries Under the United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 739 (1983).
30 See Fisheries Zones of Canada Order, supra note 3; MFCMA, supra note 4.
31 21 I.L.M. 1245ff, 1477ff (1982).
32 Proclamation on the Exclusive Economic Zone, No. 5030, 10 Mar. 1983, 22 I.L.M. 461
(1983).
33 This adoption of the provisions of UNCLOS III has taken place either explicitly by ratification, as the Canadian government has done, or implicitly by incorporation of its key provisions as
the United States has done.
34 VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 63.
35 R.S.C. ch. F-14 (1970).
36 Id. at ch. C-12.
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domestic and foreign fishing.17 The Fisheries Act is the primary source
of managerial power over domestic fisheries; the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act is the key source of managerial authority over foreign
fishing. 8
The Fisheries Act vests the power to promulgate regulations for all
areas of fisheries operations, including licensing and operating fishing
vessels, to the harvest, handling, processing and transportation of fish, in
the federal government.3 9
Rather than fleshing out numerous fishing regulations in detail, the Fisheries Act dangles three bare hooks waiting to be baited with administrative
discretion: Section 7 allows the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans "in his
absolute discretion" to issue fishing leases and licenses. Section 33 forbids
the disposal of deleterious substances into water frequented by fish but
leaves to Cabinet discretion what should be deemed deleterious. Section 34
grants the Canadian Cabinet discretion to regulate in thirteen areas: 1)
proper management of seacoast and inland fisheries; 2) conservation and
protection of fish; 3) catching, loading, landing, handling, transporting and
disposing of fish; 4) operation of fishing vessels; 5) use of fishing gear and
equipment; 6) issuing and canceling of fishing licenses and leases; 7) conditions of leases and licenses; 8) obstruction on pollution of any waters frequented by fish; 9) conservation of spawning grounds; 10) export of fish; 11)
interprovincial transport or trade of fish; 12) duties of federal employees;
and 13) delegation to federal administrators to vary any close time or fishing quota.4°
The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act authorizes the Canadian Cabinet to establish the conditions under which foreign fishing vessels may
enter Canadian fisheries, and authorizes marine investigation officers to
board and search foreign fishing vessels operating in Canadian waters.4"
Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, "the Canadian Cabinet has issued
regulations restricting such matters as mesh sizes, area closures, and species quotas." 42
Under these Acts, the Canadian Cabinet created the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans. The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has four
specific mandates: "to oversee seacoast and inland fisheries, to oversee
37 The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act prohibits foreign fishing unless authorized by regulations promulgated by the Canadian Cabinet. Id. at § 3. Section 7 of the Fisheries Act gives the
Minister of Fisheries and Forestry absolute discretion in issuing domestic licenses. See supra note
35.
38 VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 68.
39 R.S.C. ch. F-14 at § 34.
40 VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 68.
41 R.S.C. ch. F-14; R.S.C. ch. C-21 (1970).
42 See, e.g., Foreign Vessel Fishing Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, Vol. VII, ch. 815 at 5083 [as
amended]. The authority to issue foreign regulations also arises from Section 34 of the Fisheries Act
itself.
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fishing and recreational harbors, to oversee hydrography and marine sciences, and to coordinate Canada's ocean policies and programs."4 3 The
Department of Fisheries and Oceans is divided into four subsections: Atlantic Fisheries; Pacific and Freshwater Fisheries; Economic DevelopAtlantic
ment and Marketing; and Ocean Science and Surveys.'
Fisheries, which is responsible for fisheries management on the East
Coast, not only has its key staff located in Ottawa, but also has three
regional offices which carry on the bulk of managerial activities.45 The
branches and divisions of each regional office deal with all phases of fisheries management and development. These areas include scientific research, economic surveys and technology development, as well as the
actual management of fisheries.4 6

The other three divisions are not vital to this Article, but are worth
brief mention. Pacific and Freshwater Fisheries, responsible for fisheries
management in central and western Canada, is similar in structure to
Atlantic Fisheries. 47

Although some key personnel are situated in Ot-

tawa, the majority are located in three smaller regional offices.4" Development and Marketing, also stationed in Ottawa, has four major
functions: "promotion of fish marketing, development of economic data
and policy, administration of financial assistance programs, and negotiation concerning international fisheries relations."'49 Ocean Science and
Surveys is responsible for oceanographic and hydrographic programs and
operates through four regional science centers.50 The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and his deputy govern all four sectors of this federal
bureaucracy.51
While the administrative structure is clearly defined, the administrative processes involved in fishery management planning are not.52 The
actual plan-making process of Canadian fisheries management is difficult
to document for two reasons. First, many consultations with fishermen
and processors take place outside of the formally recognized channels. 53
43 VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8,at 67.

44 See generally id. at 69-72 (Administrative Organization).
45 IdL at 70.
46 See, eg., id. at 69-70.
47 Id. at 70.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.

51 Id. at 70-71 (Figure 3-1, Organization of Department of Fisheries and Oceans).
52 VanderZwaag, CanadianFisheries,supra note 8,at 185. The Canadian fisheries management
system is "some what like a ghostship... the system exists but it often lies veiled under a mysterious
mist of flexibility and informality."
53 VANDERZWAAG, THE FIsH FEUD, supra note 8,at 72.
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Second, official publications describing the management processes of this
federal bureaucracy are sparse.5 4 Still, it is possible to describe this decision-making process in general terms.
Scientific data on the recommended total allowable catch and the
conditions of existing fish stocks are provided by the Canadian Atlantic
Fisheries Scientific Advisory Committee. The data is then reviewed by
the directors of the regional offices. 5 Federal fisheries officials prepare a
draft plan to be reviewed by the regional directors or the appropriate
regional directors. This phase is generally followed by a review by the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. 6 Plan variation depends upon
whether the recommendations are developed for a region or for the entire
Atlantic fishery. 7 Advisory committees and working groups vary in
each of the regions. Few formal mechanisms exist for industry and public input except for these committees and working groups. 8 Nevertheless, informal consultation with both fishermen and processors is
considered an important element in plan development.5 9
The determination of the total allowable catch available for domestic and foreign fishermen in Canadian fishery plans includes consideration of economic, social, political, and environmental concerns.' As one
commentator noted:
Although this sounds very much like the concept of "optimum utilization",
which allows the optimum yield to be utilized for the long term, there is one
basic difference. The biological reference point for the total allowable catch
is approximately ten to twenty percent less than the maximum sustainable
yield, and 6 1this results in conservative determinations for harvest
allocations.
Biologists have viewed this as a means for improving the economic efficiency of Canadian fisheries. 62 The total allowable catch is generally ex54 Id.
55 Id. at 72-76.
56 Id.

57 Compare id. at 72-74 (Groundfish Plan-Making Process) and id. at 75 (Pelagic Plan-Making
Process).
58 "The fact that advisory groups are so numerous and constantly changing makes it impossible
to identify them all or even establish how many exist." Donna R. Christie, GeorgesBank- Common Ground or Continued Battleground: ComparativeMarine Resource Management and Environmental Assessment, 23 SAN DIEGO L.Rv. 491, 511 n.151 (1986); VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH

FEUD, supra note 8, at 72.
59 "Consultation with Canadian fishermen is on an informal, individual level and consists of
managers contacting union and company leaders when they want their advice or cooperation."
Snow, supra note 8, at 309.
60 Parzival Copes, Implementing Canada'sMarineFisheriesPolicy: Objectives, Hazardsand Constraints, 6 MARINE PoL'Y 219, 223-24 (1982).

61 VanderZwaag, Canadian Fisheries,supra note 8, at 205 n. 118.
62 Id.
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pressed in terms of quotas for various classes of fishing vessels and
specific areas.63
The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act provides authority for the Canadian Cabinet to police access to Canadian fishery zones by regulating
the activities of foreign fishermen.' However, neither the Act nor its
implementing regulations contain specific guidelines for determining the
conditions for foreign entry or the method for allocating the allowable
foreign catch. 65 Discretion and flexibility are the primary elements of
this regime. The Canadian government has generally tied foreign access
to surplus stocks to either trade or conservation concessions. In addition
to tariff reductions, the Canadian government has negotiated for such
concessions as the use of Canadian ports and processing facilities, transfer of fishing technology, and the observance of conservation measures
66
beyond the Canadian fishing zone for fisheries important to Canada.
B.

The U.S. Regime

In 1976, many political forces were opposed to any further protection of the fisheries by unilateral U.S. action. The President and the
State Department, concerned with goading other sovereign states into a
"fish war," attempted to extend U.S. fisheries jurisdiction by rational negotiation at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.67 The
Defense Department feared that any unilateral extension of fisheries jurisdiction by the United States would induce other countries to declare
their own exaggerated jurisdictional claims. This, in turn, would interfere with the free passage of U.S. warships and submarines.6 Tuna and
shrimp fishermen, fearful of foreign retaliations and closures of tradi63 VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 74: "The Canadian catch is divided

among five basic categories of vessels: under 65 feet in length/fixed gear, under 65 feet/mobile gear,
65 - 100 feet/fixed gear, 65 - 100 feet/mobile gear, and vessels over 100 feet in length. Overall quotas
for the various vessel classes are set pursuant to the planning process. According to a concept called
sector management, implemented in January 1982, inshore fishermen (vessels under 65 feet) may fish
only in their regional sector and actual management (for example, actual division of quotas among
fixed and mobile gears) would be discretionary with the Regional Director General. According to a
concept called enterprise (or company) allocation, implemented on an experimental basis in 1982,
the four major fish processing companies (National Sea Products Ltd., H.B. Nickerson & Sons, The
Lake Group, and Fisheries Products) are granted individual quotas to be caught when and how they
desire."
64 R.S.C. ch. C-21 at §§ 3,4 (1970).
65 See, e.g., Can. Gaz., Vol. 4, ch. 413 (amended through 1985).
66 Copes, supra note 60, at 232-33.
67 SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE AND NAT'L OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976,

860.
68 Id. at 951.
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tional fishing grounds, forcefully lobbied against any sweeping action on
the part of the U.S. government.69
Four forces finally drove Congress to extend unilaterally U.S. control over fisheries to 200 miles. First, foreign fishing fleets were harvesting Atlantic waters to the point of near exhaustion.7 0 Sixteen stocks were
seriously depleted and foreign nations, left to self enforcement, were not
obeying international quotas.7 1 Second, foreign fishing fleets were destroying domestic fishing gear.7 2 Third, the UNCLOS III talks promised
no early resolution, and even if there were an early resolution, it was
feared that ratification might take more than eight years.7 3 Fourth, U.S.
fishermen, seeing their livelihoods threatened by foreign factory ships,
united against their foreign counterparts and, consequently, local cooperatives and associations grew in size and number. A powerful lobby of
national organizations assailed Congress for unilateral action; action
Congress finally took in the form of legislation.7 4
This legislation, the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (MFCMA), not only creates a 200 nautical mile fishery
zone, it also establishes a comprehensive federal fishery management
scheme.75 The United States defines the scope of fisheries jurisdiction by
making three claims and one disclaimer:
The United States claims exclusive management authority over all fish
within a 197 mile zone contiguous to the territorial sea; the right to manage
andramous (non-sedentary) species throughout their migratory range, except where they enter foreign waters; and the right to manage continental
shelf fishery resources beyond the fishery-conservation zone; it disclaims the
right 76to manage highly migratory species of tuna within the conservation
zone.

State management of territorial fisheries continues primarily
through representation on Regional Management Councils. 77 The New

England Council, which has the greatest potential to affect U.S.-Canadian fisheries relations on the East Coast, has seventeen voting members
and four non-voting members.7 8 The voting members are the five directors of state marine fisheries departments, one regional director of the
69 Id. at 952-53.

70 Id. at 260.
71 Id. at 239.
72 Id. at 237.
73 Id. at 249-50.
74 S. GREENE, WASHINGTON: A STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES FISH POLICY PROCESS 17-24
(1978).
75 MFCMA, supra note 4.
76 VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 42.
77 MFCMA, supra note 4, at §§ 1852, 1856.
78 VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 43.
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National Marine Fisheries Service, and eleven "at-large" members appointed by the Secretary of Commerce from nominees submitted by state
governors. 79 In general, these councils also include non-voting representatives of the Fishery and Wildlife Service, the Coast Guard, the
Marine Fisheries Commission, and the State Department. 0
With the assistance of their staffs, as well as a Scientific and Statistical Committee and additional advisors, the councils develop fishery management plans consistent with the seven federally enacted standards" set
forth in the MFCMA. s2 These fishery management plans must include a
description and assessment of the condition of the fisheries and a determination of their "optimum yield."8s3 The regional councils are charged
with determining domestic harvesting capacity, the portion of the optimum yield available for foreign fishermen, and the extent to which U.S.
processors will utilize the domestic harvest.8 4 The single most important
determination made by these Fishery Management Councils regarding
conservation measures is the calculation of the "optimum yield." The
Act provides that the optimum yield is the amount of fish harvested that
will "provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation, with particular
reference to food production."8 5 The actual yield is calculated taking
into consideration the scientific determination of the maximum sustainable yield, modified by any relevant economic, social or ecological factors. 6 The optimum yield does not have to be expressed in terms of the
amount of fish landed. It may be expressed in such terms as the amount
of fish harvested in certain areas or during certain seasons or with a particular type of gear.8 7
The regional councils must then submit these fishery management
plans, along with proposed regulations for implementing the plans, to the
Secretary of Commerce for approval.8 8 The 1983 amendments to the
MFCMA impose strict timetables for Secretarial action on these fishery
management plans and abbreviated time periods for promulgating regu79 Id.

80 MFCMA, supra note 4, at § 1852(c).
81 See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
82 MFCMA, supra note 4, at § 1851(a)(1-7). "In summary, the seven national standards require
fishery management plans to establish nondiscriminatory conservation and management measures
based upon the best scientific information to assure optimum yield. Fisheries should be managed
throughout their range and measures should be taken to promote efficiency and avoid duplication."
Christie, supra note 58, at 505 n. 99.
83 MFCMA, supra note 4, at § 1851(a).
84 Id. at § 1853(a).
85 Id. at § 1802 (18)(A).
86 Id. at § 1802 (18)(3).
87 50 C.F.R. § 602.11 (e)(4) (1984).
88 MFCMA, supra note 4, at §§ 1853(c), 1854.
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lations for their implementation. 9 Congress instituted these procedural
revisions to improve the efficiency of the fishery management plan development and implementation process." These amendments may incidentally result in a greater role for the councils in determining domestic
fishery policies because they allow regional interests greater procedural
flexibility in the plan implementation process.
Public participation at all stages of development of fishery management plans is an important part of this process. Public meetings of the
councils, their committees, and advisory panels provide an opportunity
for discussion of fishery plans and proposed council actions.9 1 Moreover,
the councils must hold public meetings on management proposals in major ports and affected areas. 92 With this emphasis on public participation
in the fishery management plan development processes, the MFCMA restricts judicial review of regulations promulgated to implement said
plans.93
The fishery management plan process includes determinations of the
amount of fish available for foreign fishermen in the U.S. exclusive economic zone. Through these management plans, councils may also impose conservation and management measures such as gear restrictions
and designated fishing areas. 94
Because the Act creates an absolute9 5 priority for the U.S. fishing
industry, the total allowable level of foreign fishing is limited to that portion of the optimum yield not harvested by domestic fishermen. 96 A
1980 amendment to the MFCMA, the American Fisheries Promotion
Act, provides regional councils with an alternative formula for calculating the total allowable level of foreign fishing---essentially a program for
phasing out foreign fishing in the U.S. exclusive economic zone, based on
reductions in foreign fishing levels beyond actual increases in domestic
97
harvesting capacity.
89 Id. at §§ 1854(a)(1)(B), 1854(b)(1), 1855(c). Regulations to implement fishery management
plans must be promulgated within 110 days of the date the Council submits a plan. Regulations for
plans resubmitted by the Council after disapproval must be promulgated within 75 days.
90 Christie, supra note 58, at 506.
91 50 C.F.R. § 601.24(b)(4) (1984). Meetings may be closed or partially closed, in certain limited instances, such as when they relate to matters of national security or employment matters. Id.
at § 601.24(b)(4)(vi)(B).
92 MFCMA, supra note 4, at § 1852(h)(3).
93 Id. at § 1855(d)(1-2); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1977).
94 Id. at § 1853(a).
95 The Secretary of State must allot a portion of the surplus offish to foreign nations, but there is
no guarantee that such a surplus will in fact exist.
96 MFCMA, supra note 4, at § 1853(a)(4)(B).
97 Pub. L. No. 96-561, 94 Stat. 3296 (1980).
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Once the level of foreign fishing is established, the Secretary of State,
in cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce, determines the allocation of fish among foreign nations that have signed Governing International Fishing Agreements.98 Although the list of factors considered in
determining allocations contains no provisions for special deference to
neighboring countries or countries that share fish stocks, it does include a
general provision allowing consideration of "other matters deemed appropriate." 99 The 1980 amendment to the Act added other factors which
emphasized U.S. fishery industry development and trade policies when
determining foreign access to domestic stocks.o This policy links entry
into the fishing zone to affirmative acts by a country such as reducing
trade barriers and creating foreign markets for U.S. seafood exports. 10 1
While the MFCMA has helped to further the goals of conservation
enumerated by UNCLOS III, there are several shortcomings with the
Act which have limited its effectiveness. Since the passage of the
MFCMA, six major problems have plagued the U.S. fisheries management system: the council role, council composition, the lack of scientific
knowledge, plan implementation, enforcement, and the poor attitudes of
fishermen. 102
The non-federal, independent status of the regional councils is emphasized in the MFCMA. The MFCMA grants councils almost exclusive plan-making powers and limits the federal role to reviewing plans for
conformity with the seven national standards and other laws.10 3 The
contents of management plans must conform to seven national standards.
The plan must:
(1) prevent overfishing while achieving the optimum yield; (2) be based
upon the best scientific information available; (3) manage a fish stock, to the
extent feasible, as a unit throughout its range; (4) treat the fishermen of
various states equally; (5) promote efficiency but not have economic allocation as the sole purpose; (6) allow a buffer in the optimum yield figure to
account for variations in the fish resource; and (7) minimize costs and
98 MFCMA, supra note 4, at §§ 1821(e)(1)(a), 1821(a-c). In signing a Governing International
Fishing Agreement, a country must make a commitment to follow the U.S. fishery regulations and
be subject to U.S. inspection and enforcement. A country must also pay for various other items such
as observers aboard their vessels, fishing fees and the costs of loss or damage to any U.S. fishing
vessels or their gear. Id. at § 1821(c)(1-2).
99 Id. at § 1821(e)(1)(E)(viii). In the past, deferential consideration of foreign fishing rights has
been such an "appropriate matter." See, eg., VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supranote 8,at 43.
0 Id.
101 Id. at § 1821(e)(l)(E)(i-ii), (ivv).
102 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OF FISHER-

IES MANAGEMENT UNDER THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT (Jan. 9, 1979).

103 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(b) (Supp. 1980).
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duplications.10 4
The legislative history also supports the non-federal character of the
councils. The original House and Senate bills, which would have made
the councils more federal in character, were rejected. 105 Language from
the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference indicates that the eleven at-large members of regional councils are not considered government employees. 10 6 Finally, members of Congress in
various oversight hearings have strongly emphasized the independent
character of the councils. 10 7 Two areas of federal law have threatened to
undermine the autonomy of council plan making. First, the Federal Advisory Committee Act's burdensome notice requirements may prevent
councils from acting with immediacy when emergency amendments to
management plans are needed. In addition, these notice requirements
may thwart councils from supplementing or amending management
plans rejected by the Secretary of Commerce.10 8 Second, application of
federal criminal conflict of interest statutes to the councils could prevent
industry representatives on the councils from voting on management
plans because of vested financial interests in the outcomes; further, the
industry representatives may be kept from considering confidential statistical data because of competitive implications. 109 One commentator offers several other explanations for the lack of autonomy of the regional
councils based on the internal structure of the MFCMA and the structure of the U.S. federal system itself:
The federal dependency of the councils may be explained by four factors.
First, councils were like new workers in an established federal bureaucracy.
Council members had to rely on federal officers to learn all the basics, such
as who makes decisions and what guidelines to follow. A dependency once
established may be difficult to overcome. Second, since council members
are not full-time employees, meeting on an average of two to three days a
month, a natural tendency would be to rely on full-time experts who have
more time to devote to fisheries management. Third, Washington bureaucrats prefer established organizational lines and the advisory capacity is the
line they are used to. Fourth, councils have
110 relied on the Department of
Commerce for funding and some staffing.
104 Id.
105 H.R. REP. No. 940-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975); S. REP. No. 961, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975)
106 Id.
107 Fishery Conservation and Management Act Oversight: HearingsBefore the House Subcommittee on Fisheriesand Wildlife Conservation and Environment of the Committee on Merchant Marine
Fisheries,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 450 (1979)[hereinafter 1979 Oversight Hearing].
108 The Federal Advisory Committee Act requires 15 days advance notice in the Federal Register
of committee meetings. 5 U.S.C. § 10 (1976).
109 VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 47.

110 Id.
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Council memberships have continued to be dominated by representatives
from the commercial and recreational fishing industries since the adoption of the MFCMA. 111 Seventy-eight percent of the councils' at-large
members are industry representatives.1 12 Industry representatives control the majority in the New England council; other councils display a
large share of industry representation as well. 113 Such representation indicates that it is the regulated that are doing the regulating. Thus, it
appears that since regional plans are greatly affected by industry representation, such plans are subject to the short term interests of the industry representatives rather than the long-term goals of conservation
intended by the Congress.
Arguably, councils have favored the subjective, short-term desires
for profits of the fishing industry over the objective needs of conservation
and management. As one commentator notes:
Recent council plans have moved toward free-enterprise management
where government regulation is kept to a minimum.... [s]uch plans may
also be viewed in a more positive light... [t]he council has struggled seriously to maintain the proper balance of priorities: protection of the resource
versus social and economic welfare of the industry... [e]mergency amendments may be viewed as an objective commitment to treat the economic
woes of troubled fishermen... [t]he move toward free enterprise may also
1 14
be viewed as an interim phase on the path to multispecies management.
Despite the mass of scientific data collected for each fisheries management plan and the accompanying environmental impact statement,
the U.S. fisheries management regime suffers from a lack of scientific information. For instance, little information exists with regard to fishing
harvests of recreational fishermen. The salt-water sportfishing license, an
efficient vehicle of data collection, is not required in most states.115 Ecological research, particularly comprehensive studies of predator-prey and
other inter-species relationships, is still in the developmental stages.
Moreover, sociological and economic data have been so sparse and speculative that management plans have often been forced to rely on estimates of the biological conditions of existing stocks as the only valid
1 16
criterion for fish stock evaluation and management.
Due to the numerous regulations and guidelines that a regional
council's proposed management plan must follow, plan implementation
has become an administrative nightmare. "After four months to a year
111 Id. at 48.
112 Id.

113
114
115
116

See generally, id.at 48, notes 90-91.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
1979 Oversight Hearing, supra note 107, at 992-94.
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of plan formulation, another 250 to 270 days is [sic] generally required
for federal and public review."' 17 It has been observed that "[a] simple
regulatory amendment may take 120 days." ' 8 As a result of this tedious implementation process, only twelve management plans were implemented as of December 31, 1980.119 Currently, management plans have
been stalled in New England because of pressures from federal officials
and the competing interests of regional fishermen. 2
Enforcement of the MFCMA has suffered from four deficiencies:
First, state regulations or lack of regulations have provided a wide loophole
for fishermen to avoid federal management plans. For example, Maine has
imposed no restrictions of cod, haddock or yellowtail flounder that can be
harvested from its territorial waters. Fishermen have been able to catch
thousands of pounds of groundfish illegally within the federal fishery zone
and avoid punishment by claiming that the harvest occurred in state territorial waters. Second, low budgets have made enforcement personnel in short
supply. In 1979, there were fewer than thirty agents from Maine to Virginia and only five agents in Massachusetts to cover nearly forty ports and
over one thousand vessels. Third, regulations have tended to be so complex
and changing that enforcement officers have had difficulty knowing which
law to enforce. For example, the Coast Guard issued citations for violations of the surf clam plan only to find the fishing was actually legal under
the amended plan. Fourth, prosecution of violations has tended to be slow
and lax, with
many cases taking years to settle and often with very small
121
penalties.
Many government officials have pointed to what may be the most serious
obstacle in the U.S. fisheries management system: fishermen who resent
any form of regulation. The tendency, particularly among New England
fishermen, is to view the fisheries-conservation zone as a means to restrict
foreign access, not to control domestic fishing. The fishermen therefore
view any government action as an assault on independent life-styles.22
These are just some of the problems that have been plaguing the
U.S. fisheries management system since the implementation of the
Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act. The following
section addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. and Canadian
regimes, and offers some suggestions for reform of the U.S. system under
the MFCMA.
117 VANDERZwAAG, THE FISH FEUD,

supra note 8, at 49.

118 Id.

119 Id.
120 See generally, Todd Campbell, Politics as Usual inthe Halls of Congress,NAT'L FISHERMAN,
Jan. 1991, at 22.
121 VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8,at 49-50.
122 1979 Oversight Hearing, supra note 107, at 177.
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ANALYSIS

UNCLOS III sought to ensure conservation through: (1) determination of the allowable catch; (2) ensuring that the living resources in a
Coastal State's exclusive economic zone are not endangered through
over-exploitation; (3) the maintenance of the maximum sustainable yield;
and (4) the maintenance of species associated with or dependent upon the
harvested species.1 23 There are distinct differences between the Canadian
and U.S. fishery management regimes. While both nations have adopted
the UNCLOS III provisions for conservation (either expressly or implicitly), it appears that the Canadian regime of centralized authority, informality and flexibility is more likely to lead to the fulfillment of these
goals.
While the U.S. fisheries management regime emphasizes formal procedures, bifurcation of authority in plan development and implementation, and a high degree of public accountability, the Canadian regime
stresses informal procedures implemented on an ad hoc basis.124 These
regimes differ in four key areas: public accountability, flexibility, governmental authority and discretion, and the determination of the total allowable catch for foreign fishermen.
In the area of public accountability, the Canadian regime may at
first appear to be inferior to the U.S. regime. However, upon closer examination, the Canadian regime may fulfill better the goals of conservation
enumerated in UNCLOS III. Instead of being built upon closed meetings and discussions with members of the domestic fleet, which may lead
to an unsupported determination of the total allowable catch, the U.S.
procedure is constructed around a series of public meetings to receive
citizen input, culminating in a detailed fishery management plan exposed
to the rigors of scientific, economic and legal criticism.' 2 5 The development of these plans and the accompanying debate are a central feature of
the U.S. approach. In contrast, the only public document in the Canadian approach is the total allowable catch determination. Consultation
with Canadian fishermen occurs on an informal, individual level and
consists of managers contacting union and company leaders when they
want their advice or cooperation.126 It may appear that the U.S. procedure promotes the goals of conservation through its characteristic degree
of public accountability. In fact, the U.S. procedures lead to counterintuitive results for several reasons.
123 UNCLOS III, supra note 11, at art. 61(1-4).
124 Snow, supra note 8, at 309.
125 MFCMA, supra note 4, at § 1853(a); 50 C.F.R. § 601.24(b)(4) (1984).
126 Snow, supra note 8, at 309.
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First, the U.S. regime suffers from too great a degree of public accountability. While legislators have attempted to establish limits for harvesting certain species, political pressures from New England fishermen
and fishery industry representatives have thwarted such conservation
measures to protect potentially vulnerable markets. 2 7 As the federal
government launched an effort this past year to preserve New England's
groundfish stocks from over-exploitation, commercial fishermen were
coming into port with enough fish to make 1990 one of the most profitable harvest years in recent history. "Compared with 1989, last year's
landings were up 15% and the value of the domestic harvest increased
percent." 1 2 8 However, in 1990, a Massachusetts Yellowtail Flounder
Task Force declared a crisis for the haddock, cod and flounder fisheries,
and the New England Fishery Management Council reviewed several
drastic measures to conserve groundfish stocks.1 2 9 Moreover, groundfish
sales jumped to 20,470,000 pounds in 1990 from 16,881,000 pounds in
1989.130 This increase represents the failure of limiting harvests to further conservation goals.
Guarantees of immediate financial rewards have proven detrimental
to the long-term goals of conservation. Industry representatives usually
have not considered the far-reaching effects of their actions. This overfishing has reduced harvests. For example, the U.S. coastal fishermen
indiscriminantly harvest species during spawning periods, effectively reducing their own resources for future years. 3 t Further, New England
fishermen enjoyed a record year in 1990, but with severe disadvantages
for the long term:
We have to get away from the temptation of looking from year to year. We
have to look at the big picture, which is that there is much over fishing.
The recently recorded figures are misleading. If more effort is expended,
then more fish are caught. And if more fish are caught, the total value goes
up. You are only looking at a piece of the pie... There's a lot of hours
127 VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 3: "Much depends on future fishing efforts and regulatory actions... unfavorable conditions could diminish a stock and thereby tense
national nerves... much depends on future political rest or unrest of special-interest groups such as
fishermen and processors."
128 Richard Salit, New England Groundflish Catch isUp,But Officials Say Figures Are Misleading,
NAT'L FISHERMAN, June 1991, at 18.
129 Id.

130 Nancy Griffin, Regional Update: Northeast, NAT'L FISHERMAN, Yearbook 1991, at 4.
131 GLASSNER, supra note 1, at 73: "By the 1960's and early 1970's overfishing had become so
severe in such places as the North Sea, the Northwest Atlantic and the coastal waters of Peru that
some species were virtually exterminated, fishermen were thrown out of work and shore installations
related to fishing were closed down. In some places the damage was done by local fishermen often
outside the territorial sea, beyond the reach of any conservation enforcement officers there may have
been." See also id at 76, Table 76 (World Nominal Marine Catch).
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132
being put in... A lot of these [fishermen] are really going straight out.
Council members for the region have attempted to develop a five year
plan to reduce fishing efforts for codfish, yellowtail flounder and possibly

haddock. 133
Conservationists, moreover, have charged that the New England
council has ignored the long-term needs of these marine resources in order to satisfy fishermen's concerns. The Commerce Department's recently proposed guidelines mandate that the regional fishery
management councils define and curb overfishing in the region. 134 However, inshore draggermen express wariness about fishermen being locked
out of such a system. Representatives of the regional council are concerned that if the debate over limited entry delays action, "[w]e will lose
the opportunity to protect the codfish that could contribute to stock rebuilding."' 135 The council's stock replenishing goal is to achieve what
has been defined as a twenty percent maximum spawning potential for
the stock. 136 The way the council proposes to accomplish this is by
137
reducing fishing mortality by fifty percent over the next five years.
Second, the Canadian regime differs from the U.S. regime in that it
emphasizes flexibility rather than focusing on rigid, formal rules. Consultations with Canadian fishermen and industry representatives are held
on an informal basis when the Canadian government wants their advice
or cooperation. 138 These are closed meetings on an ad hoc, flexible basis. The U.S. regime focuses upon a series of public hearings to receive
citizen input.
The Canadian regime allows the Canadian federal government to
utilize its own discretion, with the scientific, economic and political evidence of experts. It makes harvest determinations without the competing
interests of individual fishermen and industry representatives who might
not take into consideration the long-term results of their actions.139 The
Canadian government does not fall prey to the demands of localized interest groups. Unfortunately, however, the U.S. regime has experienced
difficulties in implementing conservation plans in the past because of opposition by regional fishermen, who may obscure scientific findings with
132 Salit, supra note 128, at 18-19.
133 Id. at 19
134 Susan Pollack, New England Regulatory Knot Tightens Around Groundfishermen, NAT'L
FISHERMAN, April 1991, at 11.
135 Id.

136 Id. at 12.
137 Id.

138 Snow, supra note 8, at 309 n.5.
139 Id.
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short term, economic concerns. 140 Therefore, the Canadian regime better utilizes available scientific data.
Third, the Canadian regime of fisheries management fulfills the
goals of conservation set out in UNCLOS III through the centralization
of government authority. The Canadian regime vests great discretion in
the federal government.14 In contrast, the U.S. regime is characterized
by a bifurcation of authority between the regional councils and the federal government.1 42 The Regional Councils must develop fishery management plans which conform to the national standards set forth in the
MFCMA.1 4 1 There is a separation between the groups that establish the
standards and the groups that promulgate the rules of fishery management. This compounds the administrative process, and leads to an even
greater necessity for public participation.
The Canadian regime has one level of authority vested in the federal
government. Thus, less opportunity exists for industry interference in
the decision-making process. Moreover, the Canadian federal government promulgates rules for fishery management and sets the standards
for such rules. 1 4 In this manner, there is less opportunity for information to become misinterpreted or distorted to serve private interests.
Finally, the Canadian regime is better equipped to calculate the total allowable level of foreign fishing. The Canadian Cabinet has great
flexibility to control entry to Canadian fishery zones by regulating the
activities of foreign fishermen. While there are no formal guidelines for
determining the condition for foreign entry or the method for allocating
the foreign allowable catch, the Canadian government has tied foreign
access to surplus stocks to either trade or conservation concessions. 4 5
The American Fisheries Protection Act provides Regional Councils
with formulae for calculating the total allowable level of foreign fishing.
This determination is then either passed or declined by the Secretary of
State.14 6 The 1980 amendment to the MFCMA added factors for foreign
fishing determinations emphasizing U.S. fishing industry development
policies. Thus, entry into the U.S. exclusive economic zone is linked to
affirmative acts by a country which reduce trade barriers and create markets for U.S. fish exports.147 The U.S. regime emphasizes only strict
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Pollack, supra note 134, at 12. See also Salit, supra note 128, at 18-19.
R.S.C. ch. F-14; ch. C-12 (1970).
See generally, VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 43-46.
MFCMA, supra note 4, at § 1851(a)(1-7).
R.S.C. ch. F-14; ch. C-12 (1970).
Copes, supra note 60, at 223-24.
MFCMA, supra note 4, at § 1853(a).
Pub. L. No. 96-561, 94 Stat. 3296 (1980).
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trade policy concessions, ignoring conservation measures which are encouraged by the provisions of UNCLOS III.
There is no doubt that the MFCMA has had little success in the
New England region. The reason for this poor performance is evident:
very little attention has been paid to limiting entry of domestic fishermen.
The result has been a drop in average weight landed by fishermen in the
region from over 42,000 pounds in 1962 to less than 27,000 pounds in
1987, and a decline in average earnings per fisherman from approximately $5,500 in 1979 to approximately $3,500 in 1987 (adjusted by the
Consumer Price Index).148 The number of domestic fishing vessels over
five tons has nearly doubled since 1976, but the domestic harvest has not
increased by nearly as much, and the most important species continue to

be over-harvested. 149
For each of the above discussed reasons, the U.S. regime appears to
be less effective at meeting the goals of conservation enumerated under
UNCLOS III. The following section seeks to address possible reforms to
the U.S. regime in light of these findings.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Upon reviewing these two regimes, the Canadian regime actually
fulfills the conservation goals of UNCLOS III. The United States may
reform the structure of its management scheme through several means.
The United States could amend the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act in such a way as to limit the role of the Regional Councils, either by making their roles advisory or eliminating the
Regional Councils completely. Through such a revision, the U.S. federal
government would have a greater opportunity to eliminate many of the
private interests that run contrary to conservation goals. 150 However,
equality of
since such a proposal is contrary to the democratic idea of
1 51
representation, it is unlikely to win much popular support.
Yet another suggestion would be to implement standards utilizing
the most current scientific data available at the federal level which would
then be followed by the Regional Councils. Through this procedure, the
148 J.L. McHugh, Fisheries Under the Magnuson Act: Is it Working?, 21 OCEAN DaV. & INT'L L.
225 (1990).
149 Id. at 255-56.
150 VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 48: "Since the regulated tend to do the
regulating, councils have arguably favored the subjective whims of the fishing industry rather than
the objective needs of conservation and management."
151 While this assertion begs the discussion of similarities between the overall U.S. and Canadian
government structures, such a discussion would be too unwieldy to be discussed herein and is best
left to another study.

U.S. & Canadian Fishery Management Policies

13:177(1992)
federal government would set conservation goals to be observed by all of
the regional fisheries. This centralization of authority would eliminate
much of the discretion now held by the Regional Councils. These councils are highly responsive to regional interests and might not consider the
long-term effects their actions have upon the fisheries under their jurisdiction."t 2 Currently, the U.S. regime does not effectively allow for internalization of the economic externalities created by domestic harvesting.
Following this suggestion, the federal government could amend the
MFCMA in such a manner as to centralize it in a way similar to the
Canadian regime."' 3 This centralized, federal structure in Canada allows for federally mandated internalization of the economic externalities
1 54
created by domestic fishermen.
In implementing these formal standards for conservation, the federal government may also choose to eliminate many of the requirements
for formal hearings at either or both levels of the decision-making process. While such standard-setting does require some minimum procedural hearings, the organic statute (the MFCMA) may be amended to
eliminate such hearings at the federal level, at the stage of promulgating
standards to be followed by the Regional Councils. While it is true that
these standards must take into consideration the best scientific and economic evidence available, other factors should also be considered. It is at
the regional decision-making level that such information should be considered, but again, this evidence should not overturn existing rules based
on scientific and economic data. Rather, the U.S. regime should adopt a
more informal procedure similar to that of Canada, which seeks information from fishermen and fishery industry representatives on an ad hoc

basis. 155
Finally, when promulgating rules regarding foreign fishing, the
United Sates should adopt a regime similar to that of Canada as well.
The Canadian regime emphasizes conservation measures over domestic
economic success, and encourages such conservation measures on the
152 VANDERZWAAG, TH FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 48: "In 1978, the council's groundfish
plan, based on biological data, recommended a catch of 6,000 metric tons of haddock, 27,500 metric
tons of cod, and 8,100 metric tons of yellowtail flounder. When the industry complained of low
quotas, the council listened. In three emergency amendments the quotas soared to 29,254 metric
tons of haddock and 66,340 metric tons of cod."
153 See, e-g., Todd Campbell, World Fisheries Management Earns Poor Marks, NAT'L FISHERMAN, Yearbook 1991, at 45: "The government stepped in with an infusion of capital and created
two super companies and granted them enterprise allocations, which guaranteed them fixed quotas
of fish to catch. By the end of the decade, it became clear that earlier stock assessments had been far
too optimistic and were drastically reduced. The Canadians have done a better job than we have."
154 Id. at 42-45.
155 Snow, supra note 8, at 309.
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part of foreign states by connecting foreign fishing rights with concessions for conservation as well as trade measures.15 6 The U.S. regime focuses on trade concessions much more heavily than conservation
measures, and seeks to ensure an absolute priority for the U.S. fishing
15 7
industry without strongly encouraging conservation.
Unfortunately, it is not likely that there will be such reforms in the
near future. The New England fishing industry forms a powerful lobby
group and is not likely to surrender its influence over fishery management policies. The promise of immediate financial rewards obscures the
larger goals of conservation. Consequently, the legislature must search
further for a viable alternative to the U.S. regime which will further not
only the goals of conservation enumerated in UNCLOS III, but also foster international cooperation.
VI.

SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

The U.S. fisheries regime does not appear to meet the conservation
goals of UNCLOS III. Numerous suggestions for reform have been recommended in the past. One of those suggestions has already proven effective in managing common fisheries shared by the United States and
Canada: the implementation of international treaties to jointly manage
the fishery region.
Prior to 1985, Canada and the United States had unsuccessfully negotiated a salmon treaty for over fifteen years. The desired result was an
accord which would limit the number of salmon harvested which
originated in the rivers of the other country. The intent of such an agreement was to ensure that both countries would reap the benefits of investment in their salmon fisheries. One factor hindering such an agreement
was that the fishermen who benefitted from the agreement would not be
the ones who would bear the economic burdens of the agreement. As
one commentator has noted:
For instance, an Alaskan fisherman may be asked to reduce his catch of
salmon destined for Canadian rivers and a Canadian fisherman may be
asked to reduce his catch bound for Washington state. The Alaskan fisherman would suffer greatly, but would receive no corresponding benefit, while
the Washington
fisherman's stock is increased with no corresponding
1 58
detriment.
In 1985, the Treaty between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the United States of America Concerning Pacific Salmon
156 Copes, supra note 60, at 223-24.
157 MFCMA, supra note 4, at § 1821(e)(1)(E)(i-ii), (iv,v).
158 Citizens for Ocean Law, OCEAN POL'Y NEWS 1 (Jan. - Feb. 1985).
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(Pacific Salmon Treaty, or Treaty) was ratified. 5 9 This treaty had been
drafted to preserve the Pacific salmon, a valuable export commodity,
from over-exploitation during the spawning season. Increasing over-exploitation by Canadian fishermen had demonstrated to the United States
the disadvantages of noncooperation. 160
The Pacific Salmon Treaty focuses on two fishery management principles: the first is conservation; the second addresses international harvest
allocation, also referred to as equity.1 61 The Treaty provides that both
Canada and the United States conduct their fisheries and salmon enhancement programs so as to prevent overfishing, provide for optimum
production, and ensure that both countries receive benefits commensurate with the production of salmon originating in their waters.1 62 However, achievement of these goals is limited by three considerations which
each nation must take into account: (1) the desirability in most cases of
reducing interceptions; (2) the desirability in most cases of avoiding undue disruptions of existing fisheries; and (3) annual variations in abun1 63
dance of the stocks.
"Equity" is defined as a "pragmatic reformulation of the countries'
state of origin principles for harvest of anadromus fish." 1" This principle of equity is consistent with Article 66 of UNCLOS III which states
that nations in whose rivers anadromus stocks originate shall have the
primary interest in and responsibility for such stocks.16 5 Neighboring
states, through whose waters the salmon migrate, and other nations fishing the stocks are required to cooperate with the state of origin to achieve
conservation and management of the resource and may elect to do so
through regional organizations. The managerial form used to fulfill the
Treaty's conservation and equity requirements is a two-tiered, bilateral
bureaucracy.
The upper tier is the Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission. The Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission governs the management of the
Northeast Pacific. This is the region where the salmon spawn annually, a
159 Treaty Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of
America Concerning Pacific Salmon, Treaty Doc. No. 99-2, March 18, 1985 [hereinafter The Pacific
Salmon Treaty]; see also Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea
17-35 (Donald McRae & Gordon Munro eds., 1989) [hereinafter McRAE & MUNRO].
160 Thomas C. Jensen, The UnitedStates - CanadaPacifi Salmon Interception Treaty:An Historical and Legal Overview, 16 ENvTL. L. 363, 422 (1986).
161 Id. at 400.
162 The Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 159, at art. III, para. 1.
163 Id. at para. 3.
164 Jensen, supra note 160, at 400.
165 UNCLOS III, supra note 11, at art. 66.
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region shared by both the United States and Canada. 66 Representation
on this Commission is divided equally between the two Coastal States,
1 67
with four commissioners each from Canada and the United States.
The purpose of the Commission is to represent the governments of the
United States and Canada in the implementation of the Treaty. Each
nation has one vote in the Commission; a decision or recommendation of
68
the Commission shall be made only with the approval of both sections.'
"The Canadian and United States resource managers have come to mutual agreements from differing viewpoints regarding optimal manage' 1 69
ment strategies."
The Pacific Salmon Treaty also establishes three subordinate, bilateral panels, consisting of six representatives from each country. Decisions or recommendations of these panels also require the concurrence of
both nations' representatives. 170 These panels serve as an expert staff for
the Commission. They receive technical information from the two countries and from bilateral technical teams. 17 ' The Commission then recommends harvest regulations and limits to each country. Each country
promulgates and enforces regulations to accomplish the goals of these
72
Commission regulations.'
The instrumentality by which the United States seeks to meet its
obligations under the Pacific Salmon Treaty is established under the domestic enabling legislation, The Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985
(Treaty Act). 173 The Act identifies the respective roles of many individual actors, including the federal government, the states of Washington,
Oregon and Alaska, the Northwest's treaty Indian tribes, and the commercial and recreational fishing interests. 74 The Treaty Act also sets
forth the processes by which decisions are made in the U.S. section of the
Commission and panels.' 75 The Treaty Act was drafted by many of the
same federal, state, tribal and user group representatives who participated in the final implementation negotiations of the Pacific Salmon
Treaty. 176 The Treaty Act delegates to the states of Oregon, Washington, Alaska, and the twenty-four treaty Indian tribes, the principal re166 Joy A. Yanagida, The Pacific Salmon Treaty, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 577-92 (1987).
167 MCRAE & MUNRO, supra note 159, at 28-29.
168 The Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 159, at art. II, para. 6.
169 MCRAE & MUNRO, supra note 159, at 28.

170 The Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 159, at art. II, paras. 21-22.
171 Id. at art. III.
172 Id.

173 Pub. L. 99-5, 99 Stat. 7, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3631-44 (West 1985).
174 Id.
175 Id.

176 Jensen, supra note 160, at 411.
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sponsibilities for implementation of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, subject to
federal government intercession if the United States is not fulfilling its
177
obligations under the Treaty.
The Treaty Act provides that the U.S. Section of the Pacific Salmon
Commission will be comprised of four persons "knowledgeable or experienced concerning Pacific Salmon," appointed by the President.1 78 One
seat is given to an Alaskan resident appointed from a list submitted by
the Governor of Alaska, one to an Oregon or Washington resident appointed from a list jointly submitted by the governors of those two states,
one appointed from a list provided by the treaty Indian tribes of179Idaho,
Oregon and Washington, and one to a U.S. government official.
Decisions of the U.S. Section of the Commission are by consensus.18 The state and tribal commissioners are all authorized to vote, but
the federal commissioner does not. 81 Alaska, Oregon, Washington and
the tribes have equal input into the implementation of the Pacific Salmon
Treaty. This forces internal U.S. negotiations. Although the federal
commissioner cannot overrule U.S. Section decisions, the Commissioner
is expected to fulfill a necessary conciliatory and advisory function.' 8 2
The Treaty Act strikes similar balances in the three U.S. panels.
The U.S. Section of the Southern Panel, for example, has six members:
five fishery managers and one user group representative. 83 The managers are required to have "fishery management responsibility and expertise."18' 4 One represents the federal government, one the state of Oregon,
one the state of Washington, two the treaty Indian tribes, and one who is
"knowledgeable and experienced in the salmon fisheries" represents the
fishing industry."8
In the U.S. Section of the Southern Panel, recommendations and decisions require the concurrence of a majority in attendance, and voting must include at least one tribal representative and
both the Oregon and Washington representatives.' 8 6
177 Pacific Salmon Treaty: Hearings on HR. 1093 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine Fisheries, 99th Cong.,
1st. Sess. 95-96 (Feb. 25, 1985); 85 C.I.S. H561-21.2.
178 16 U.S.C. § 3632(a). Alternate commissioners are appointed by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior. Id. at § 3632(b).
179 Id. at § 3632(a).
180 Id. at § 3 6 3 2 (g)(1).
181 Id. at § 3632(a): "The United States shall be represented on the Commission by four United
States commissioners... [of] these, one shall be an official of the United States government who
shall be a non-voting member of the United States Section ...
182 Id.
183 Id. at § 3632(b).

184 Id. at § 3632(c).
185

Id.

186 Id.at §§ 3632(g)(2), (4).
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The Treaty Act reserves to the United States the power to preempt
(in certain limited circumstances) the decisions and recommendations of
the U.S. Section of the Commission and the states and tribes. The Act
anticipates two situations where preemption may be necessary. First, the
Act empowers the Secretary of State to announce to the U.S. Section that
the United States is in jeopardy of not fulfilling its international obligations under the Pacific Salmon Treaty.18 7 The Secretary may set a deadline for action by the U.S. Section on a specific issue, if deemed
necessary. If the U.S. Section has not taken action to ameliorate the Secretary's concern by that date, the issue may be referred, after consultation with the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior, to the President
188
for ultimate resolution.
Second, the Treaty Act authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to
preempt state or tribal regulations when such regulations (or failure to
regulate) put the United States in jeopardy of not fulfilling its international obligations under the Pacific Salmon Treaty. 18 9 But even if a state
or tribe is in fact jeopardizing a Treaty obligation, the Secretary of Commerce may not preempt without notice. Normally, fifteen days notice is
required, unless earlier action is deemed necessary.

190

Commerce De-

partment preemption of tribal fisheries subject to the continuing jurisdiction of a U.S. district court must be undertaken through the framework
of that court's jurisdiction.1 9 1 This restriction on the Department of
Commerce was included because the district courts in western Washington and Oregon retain continuing jurisdiction over most Pacific Northwest tribal fisheries. 192

In keeping with the general substance of the Treaty Act, which
places principal responsibility for implementation and operation of the
Pacific Salmon Treaty in the regional managers, certain limitations are
placed on the Commerce Department's Treaty implementation role. The
Treaty Act grants the Secretary of Commerce the power to promulgate
187 Id. at § 3632(g)(7).
188 Id

189 Id at § 3635.
190 Id.
191 Jensen, supra note 160, at 415 & n. 189: "Section 3635 provides in part that should the
United States action be required to meet treaty obligations to Canada with respect to treaty Indian
fisheries conducted in terminal areas subject to the continuing jurisdiction of a United States District
Court, such action shall be taken within the framework of such court jurisdiction."
192 "Treaty Indian fisheries in Western Washington remain within the continuing jurisdiction of
the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington in United States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1984); tribal fisheries on the Columbia River are within the
continuing jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon in United States
v. Oregon, 302 F.Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969)." Id. at 415 & n. 190.
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regulations to carry out U.S. Pacific Salmon Treaty obligations in only
two limited instances: (1) where the Secretary has preempted state or
tribal regulations (or inaction), and (2) to institute conforming amendatory regulations in federal waters. 193 In either event, the Secretary of
Commerce must first consult with the Secretary of the Interior and the
appropriate regional fishery management council. 194 The Treaty Act
also grants the Secretary authority to promulgate regulations in tandem
with the regional councils, tribes, and states, though these regulations are
not to conflict with state and tribal Treaty implementing regulations. 195
Finally, the Treaty Act provides for expedited federal court review of any
regulation promulgated by the Commerce Department under the Act. 196
Turning from the implementation of the Pacific Salmon Treaty in
the United States, this Article looks to the actual application of the
Treaty, and its consequences in the Pacific Northwest. Once the joint
custodians of the Pacific salmon agree on optimal salmon management
policies, bargaining is limited to the allocation of economic rewards derived from the region. 197 As stated previously, in carrying out its functions, the Commission is governed by two principles: equity and the
prevention of over-fishing, and to provide for optimal production for
both Coastal States. 198 Commentators have remarked that this system
has advantages for both Coastal States in economic terms. Even more
importantly, uniform conservation measures have also led to increased
efficiency in the harvesting of salmon stocks, and an increase in existing
stocks

as well.

19 9

Recently, researchers have studied the strength and size of Pacific
salmon stocks. Salmon stocks in two of the Pacific Northwest's rivers
could be declared threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act, depending upon the outcome of a complex process set in motion
in 1990.2
In the past five years, there has been a marked decline in
193 16 U.S.C. §§ 3636(a), (b).
194 Id. at §§ 3635, 3636.
195 Id. at § 3636(b).
196 Id. at § 3636(c).
197 MCRAE & MUNRO, supra note 159, at 31: "If it were necessary to measure precisely the
benefits of salmon production, the opportunities for wrangling would be limitless. What, for example, is really meant by the 'economic benefit' of a Fraser-produced sockeye or a Columbia-produced
chinook? Economists and lawyers could debate the issue endlessly." See also Gordon Munro, The
Optimal Management of TransboundaryRenewable Resources, XII CAN. J.ECON. 355-76 (1979).
198 Id. at 30.
199 See, eg., Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Information Bulletin, No. 1-HQ-85IE (1985).
200 Brad Matsen, Regional Updates: British Columbia, Washington and Oregon, NAT'L FISHERMAN, Yearbook 1991, at 21-23: "In April, the Shoshone-Bannock tribe in Idaho petitioned the
regional director to list Snake River sockeye salmon under the Endangered Species Act. By early
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total harvests in both the United States and Canada.2 0 1 Such declines
can be attributed to attempts to manage the total harvest of salmon in
the Pacific Northwest, especially in light of the endangerment of several
species subject to the Treaty.
While the power of management and short-term allocation of harvests is reasonably straightforward, the long-term problem of the division
of the residual or "baseline" benefits from the entire set of salmon fisheries remains.
In spite of American fears of being overall debtors, in practice the Canadian
members of the Commission have taken the view that there is a rough balance between American interceptions of Fraser River sockeye salmon and
the Canadian interceptions of American Chinook salmon, as allowed under
the Pacific Salmon Treaty.2 "2

The further point has been made that "if the Treaty succeeds in stimulating extensive enhancement and resource conservation, the relative impor' 20 3
tance of the baseline benefits will steadily decline."
Such a regime may be possible to implement in the North Atlantic
region, though several drawbacks are apparent. Most importantly, the
North Atlantic region contains numerous indigenous species of fish.2 "4
Thus, rather than simply attempting to manage one species, such a treaty
would in fact have to study and propose harvest allocations and conservation goals for many species, requiring much more diverse and compliautumn, the council determined that there was enough evidence to study the requests, and is performing a review of the stocks which must be completed within twelve months. After that, the
Secretary of Commerce has another year to determine if one or more of the species are threatened or
endangered. If such declarations are made, the effects on commercial and sport fishermen, hydropower companies and other river users will be dramatic. If, for instance, one or more of the species
are declared endangered, absolutely no mortality will be permitted. Because stocks are intermingled
in the ocean from Alaska to California, and the taking of one species is prohibited, fishermen could
be forced off the grounds entirely to avoid such a taking."
201 Id. at 22. In 1986, the Canadian domestic harvest of salmon was at an all time high of approximately 230 million pounds, and has since declined to approximately 190 million pounds in
1990. In 1986, the total harvest of salmon in Oregon was approximately 13.5 million pounds, and in
1990, that harvest declined to about 5 million pounds. In Washington, in 1986, the total harvest was
estimated at 50 million pounds, and that harvest declined to approximately 42.5 million pounds in
1990. Thus it would appear that by limiting total harvests, the United States and Canada have
attempted to increase existing fish stocks in the region that is jointly managed by them.
202 MCRAE & MUNRO, supra note 159, at 34.
203 Id.
204 VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 3-25. VanderZwaag identifies several

species with high conflict potential for the United States and Canada: Herring (Clupea Harengus);
Cod (Gadus Morhua); Haddock (MelanogrammusAeglefinus); Atlantic Sea Scallops (Placopecten
Magellanicus); Pollock (Pollachius Virens); and Illex Squid (Illex flecebrosus). Further, he identifies
several species with moderate to low conflict potential: Atlantic Lobster (Homarus Americanus);
Argentine (Argentina Silus); Cusk (Brosme Brosme); Redfish (Sebastes Marinus); Silver Hake
(MerlucciusBilinearis); Red Hake (Urophycis Chuss); White Hake (Urophycis Tenuis); Loligo Squid
(Loligo Pealei); and Mackerel (Scomber Scombrus).

U.S. & Canadian Fishery Management Policies

13:177(1992)
cated scientific research. Further, nations outside of the United States
and Canada rely upon the stocks native to the area.
In addition to simply ratifying a treaty regarding each other's fishing
practices, the United States and Canada must come to an agreement regarding the determination of a total allowable level of foreign fishing for
the region. Political and economic considerations must be taken into account by each party. 20 5 Finally, while each Coastal state may agree
upon the need for conservation measures, there is considerable debate
regarding the equitable proportionate share of species within the region,
as several of these stocks straddle the boundaries of the exclusive economic zones of both the United States and Canada.20 6 For these reasons,
it might be difficult for the two nations to reach an accord as quickly as
they did when devising the Pacific Salmon Treaty.
It is clear that many factual differences exist between the Pacific
Salmon fishery and the North Atlantic fishery. As a result, a North Atlantic treaty would require much more intense negotiations. However,
the possibility of such a treaty remains a viable alternative to the current
international regime of the expression of sovereign states' rights and
strict notions of territorialism.2 °7
VII.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that while the U.S. and Canadian marine fishery management regimes profess to fulfill the goals of conservation expounded in
the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the Canadian regime of centralized authority, informal procedures and flexibility actually
fulfills the goals of (1) determining the total allowable catch; (2) ensuring
that the living marine resources in the exclusive economic zone are not
endangered by over-exploitation; (3) ensuring that the populations of
such species are maintained or restored at levels that permit the maximum sustainable yield; and (4) guaranteeing that associated or dependent species are maintained above levels at which their reproduction may
205 See, e.g., VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD, supra note 8, at 42 (Extent of Foreign Fishing)
and at 72 (Administrative Plan-Making Procedures).
206 ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & ALAN V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 207 (1983): "Of course,

not all fish remain in a single state's exclusive economic zone all the time. Where stocks migrate
between two or more exclusive economic zones or between an exclusive economic zone and the high
seas, there is a general duty on interested states to cooperate in management."
207 ATTARD, supra note 9, at 152: "It may be argued that the existence of these bilateral treaties
tends to weaken the evidence in favor of the customary rule relating to the sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the living resources. The fact that
Coastal States are prepared to allow access may indicate that they are not certain about the binding
nature of said rule. On the contrary, however, the granting of access should be considered as the
exercise of such rights rather than a derogation."
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be seriously threatened.2"'
Perhaps if the United States were to adopt some of the elements of
the Canadian regime, conservation goals would be furthered. However,
a more effective means of meeting the conservation goals of UNCLOS III
would be to adopt a North Atlantic Fishery Treaty with Canada,
modeled after the Pacific Salmon Treaty. In this way, not only could
international conservation measures be advanced, but there could also be
a heightened sense of international cooperation that might lead to the
adoption of such treaties in other regions where two sovereign states
share common fish stocks across their exclusive economic zones.
Through such treaties, it is likely that international cooperation could
create uniformity in conservation measures, rather than relying upon a
series of individual coastal states adopting individual, and often competing, measures. Such a system would most effectively meet the goals of
conservation expressed by the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, leading to an increase in available marine resources to be exploited by the world's growing population.

208 Snow, supra note 8, at 309.

